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1. Introduction 
Since 1998, every student in a Massachusetts public school takes the state-
administered Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) exam. 
For some students, the exam is the culmination of months of preparation, the 
determining factor as to whether they may graduate. But for many high achieving 
students, the two-week testing period is vacation: it’s a break from classes. From 
an educator’s perspective, this latter group is losing out on valuable class time if 
they all pass. So should we make them take it?  
 Backtrack to 1993, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled 
in McDuffy v. Robertson that the state had not been doing enough to financially 
support certain schools. In the words of the court, “the reality is that children in 
the less affluent communities (or in the less affluent parts of them) are not 
receiving their constitutional entitlement of education as intended and mandated 
by the framers of the Constitution.” The Massachusetts Education Reform Act 
promised to solve some of these problems. It was designed to reform and 
modernize Massachusetts public education by equalizing resources across 
districts, legalizing charter schools, and instituting a statewide exam system over 
a seven year period. This exam system became the MCAS. 
Lawmakers argued that with MCAS results, the state could evaluate 
school progress towards meeting newly set learning expectations and adjust 
funding allocations accordingly.1 Prior to 1998, the state used the Massachusetts 
Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) exam to evaluate success of schools 
around Massachusetts. It was administered biennially to both the 4th and 8th grades 
and either the 10th or 12th grade, depending on the year. However, schools had 
little incentive to focus on the exam as poor results led to few consequences. With 
the shift to MCAS in 1998, everything changed. By the spring of 2001, all 10th 
grade students in Massachusetts public schools were required to pass the English 
Language Arts (ELA) section and the math section in order to graduate. Schools 
faced repercussions for poor test results, including the threat of state takeover. 
And the stakes are only growing. In 2009, all 10th grade students were required to 
pass English and math sections, as well as one science section of their choosing, 
to graduate.2  
The MCAS came at the same time when the federal government was 
adding its weight to testing too. No Child Left Behind (NCLB), passed in 2002, 
stipulated that states implement high-stakes exams, a qualification which MCAS 
                                                 
1The state recently took control of thirty underperforming high schools in Massachusetts after poor 
MCAS results and high dropout rates. Control was revoked from the district and given to the 
state’s department of education.  
2
 MCAS initially tested students in the 4th, 8th, and 10th grades in English and math to evaluate 
schools. Because of NCLB, the exam has expanded to the point that students must take MCAS 
exams every year from 3rd grade to 10th grade (except for 9th grade), in an increasing number of 
subjects. 
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fulfilled. On the national level, a number of papers have highlighted the 
consequences of NCLB and its impacts (Neal & Schanzenbach (2007), Reback 
(2007), and Loveless (2008), among others). The act has stirred much 
controversy, of which one debate is its effect on high achieving students. With its 
legal framework focused on improving underprivileged schools, it places little 
emphasis on those that consistently pass. It is possible, therefore, that these high 
achieving schools were adversely affected by laws intended to help the 
underprivileged. The same applies in Massachusetts. Though the MCAS may 
have helped the state identify struggling schools, there may very well have also 
been unintended consequences on high achieving students. 
Instead of only focusing on underachieving schools, this paper will focus 
on the MCAS’s effect on both low and high achieving districts. More specifically, 
I pose the question: has the MCAS had a detrimental effect on the academic 
achievement of high achieving districts in both an absolute sense and in a relative 
sense compared to low achieving districts? Given the emphasis on low 
performing school districts, it is distinctly possible that they have performed 
relatively better compared to high achieving schools since 1998 (the year MCAS 
was introduced) or 2001 (the year MCAS became high stakes). High stakes 
testing analyses over the past three decades on both the national and state level 
have produced conflicting results. With eight years of data since the shift to high 
stakes testing, it is an opportune time to examine the case of Massachusetts and 
examine whether the high stakes MCAS has had a positive or negative influence 
on the best and worst performing districts. 
In Section 2, I consider previous research on high stakes testing, ranging 
from individual to national analyses. Section 3 describes the data set used for the 
study, while Section 4 develops the framework for analysis. This includes the 
metrics used for determining performance and the regressions run. The results 
section (Section 5) analyzes the outcomes of these regressions and determines 
whether the results are significant. In the conclusion (Section 6), the paper 
summarizes these findings in the context of previous studies on the national level. 
The appendices provide more detailed tabular results for the regressions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 This section cites a number of studies that address the effect of high stakes 
testing on student performance. Some specifically consider the impact on low 
achieving students versus high achieving students, while others consider the 
impacts more holistically. They vary widely in their results, and thus this section 
will be organized based on their findings. The first section will consist of studies 
that find the gap between low and high achieving students closing; the second will 
include studies which find the gap widening; the third section will contain studies 
that believe the gap remains unchanged; and the fourth will consider the impact 
on low income and urban students. 
2
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2.1 The gap is closing 
One of the best known studies on high achieving students is by Tom 
Loveless (2008), who examined the impact of NCLB on high achieving students. 
He utilized national student-level data from the 4th and 8th grade National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) exam, one of the nation’s oldest 
exams and one that is administered to a random sampling of schools around the 
country.3 He defined students at the 10th percentile as low achieving students and 
students at the 90th percentile as high achieving students, and tested the possibility 
that, since NCLB, the scores of high achieving students on the NAEP had slowed 
relative to those of lower achieving students. He analyzed these groups’ NAEP 
scores over time, using 2002, the year that NCLB was passed, as the significant 
year in his regressions. His research confirmed his hypothesis, indicating over a 
year’s worth of improvement of learning in low achieving students. Though high 
achieving students did not stop improving, their progress had slowed drastically 
since 2002.  
Carnoy and Loeb (2002) found no difference in dropout rates after high 
stakes testing was implemented. They first created an index for the strength of 
accountability for each state and compared the index to student improvement on 
NAEP math tests between 1996 and 2000. In their model they used both 4th and 8th 
grade NAEP exams, and they included a term for “survival rate” (the proportion 
of students who reach the 12th grade) as well. The recursive regression model 
found no evidence of a relationship between accountability and high school 
completion rates or retention rates. However, they found that, on average, states 
which shifted to high accountability exams had greater improvements on the 8th 
grade NAEP math exam than states which did not implement high stakes testing. 
Carnoy and Loeb posited that schools with high achieving students may feel 
pressure and have a better ability to increase performance in response to greater 
external accountability. 
Using individual level data in high stakes exams, Randall Reback (2007) 
examined the possibility that teachers overcommit resources to students 
immediately around the passing threshold. He focused on the Texas standardized 
testing scheme and found improvement in low achieving students. In contrast, 
high achieving students were unaffected. More specifically, students were 
particularly successful when their score was important to a school’s accountability 
rating. This implies a short-term shift in resources towards low achieving students 
at the cost of high achieving students. To use Reback’s own words, “Relatively 
high achieving students perform worse than usual if their own performance is 
irrelevant to the short-run accountability incentives.” 
2.2 The gap is widening 
                                                 
3
 One particular advantage of the exam is that it has no ceiling effect. In other words, scores are 
linear, making the difference between a 100 and 101 equal to the difference between a 200 and 
201. 
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In contrast to Loveless, Carnoy and Loeb, and Reback, a wide array of 
studies have found an increasingly large gap between low and high achieving 
schools as a result of high stakes exams. Neal and Schanzenbach (2007) analyzed 
test scores in the Chicago school district from 2001 to 2002, a period when 
Chicago Public Schools shifted from a system of low stakes testing to a high 
stakes system. Though it was unclear whether high achieving students made any 
progress, low achieving students continued to lag far behind others. Only those 
students who were initially around the proficiency threshold had a significant 
improvement in scores. Such findings indicated the possibility that teachers 
focused their efforts on those students they felt could be pushed over the 
threshold, at the cost of those who were far above or far below (reflecting the 
threshold findings of Reback).4 
In a study of 32 communities in metropolitan Boston, Bolon (2001) 
published a report on the 10th grade math MCAS. More specifically, he developed 
a model of performance on the exam in an attempt to be able to predict results on 
future exams. He found that covariates were immensely significant in his 
models—per capita community income, for example, accounted for 84% of the 
variance in performance, “by far the strongest factor in predicting tenth grade 
MCAS mathematics scores.” Percentage of limited English proficiency students 
in each district was the second most significant influence, though its overall effect 
was small. Variables involving race were not found to be statistically significant, 
and school spending only had a weak association. Bolon concluded that social 
factors had the strongest impact, and that year-to-year changes were small, 
statistical uncertainties that could be explained by simple variations in the data. 
Furthermore, schools which succeeded were more likely to succeed in the future, 
whereas those who failed were more likely to continue failing. The increase in 
state funding from $1.3 billion to $3 billion for low-income schools seemed to 
have little impact. Overall, Bolon argued, the implementation of the MCAS 
actually widened the achievement gap further. 
2.3 The gap is unchanged 
In contrast to these previous studies, Jacob (2001) had differing results 
when he used data from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) to 
evaluate the effect of exit exams on graduation rates and math or reading 
achievement. He found neither an appreciable effect of graduation tests on the 
probability that an average student graduates nor a positive impact on student 
achievement. In fact, the only students who seemed to be affected by the exams 
were the lower achieving students. In states where testing was present, the lowest 
decile saw small gains in learning, yet they also were 25% more likely to drop out 
of school than the bottom decile in states without high stakes tests. On average, 
                                                 
4
 Herein lies an adverse selection issue. Students who are far below the threshold might be 
encouraged to drop out by school officials so that district test scores are not lowered, and thus 
officials would not face repercussions. 
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students in both test states and non-test states made the same learning gains in 
high school, though those with testing schemes entered high school further 
behind, and these states also serve more disadvantaged populations. 
Springer (2008) addressed the previously mentioned findings of Reback 
(2007) regarding teachers teaching to threshold students. With data from an 
internet test developed by the Northwest Education Association, Springer 
examined 3rd to 8th grade results in an unnamed northwest state. In this state with a 
new high stakes testing scheme, he did not find this threshold phenomenon, what 
he calls “educational triage.” Instead, he found students at all levels improving 
under high stakes testing. Springer does leave open the possibility that schools 
shifted resources or studied to the test, but his results provide at least some 
evidence against the possibility of focusing on students at the threshold. 
2.4 Effects on low income and urban students 
Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2009) took a unique approach to the 
aforementioned threshold issue of Reback (2007) on the MCAS, choosing to 
analyze only urban school students around the passing threshold. Using individual 
level data from the 10th grade math MCAS in 2004, the authors attempted to 
predict whether a student would graduate based on their passage or failure of the 
exam. With a regression discontinuity design, their results indicated that there was 
no difference in dropout rate between those who barely passed and those who 
barely failed the exam, with one notable exception: students who were in urban 
and low-income school districts. Interestingly, these findings were not consistent 
with the ELA MCAS, which had no such effect. Papay, Murnane, and Willett 
provide the explanation that suburban districts have fewer students who fail, and 
can concentrate resources on struggling students. Urban, low income schools, 
however, have a greater number of failing students, have limited resources, and 
thus cannot afford to pay for one-on-one remediation as suburban schools can. 
This phenomenon is best exemplified with the following statistic: 80% of students 
in the 2006 cohort graduated on time, but only 57% of urban, low income students 
did. Still, the authors concede that the effect of high stakes exams is unclear: they 
could encourage a student to graduate who might not otherwise, or alternatively 
they could discourage a student to drop out who otherwise might have graduated. 
Papay, Murnane, and Willett sum up their results, writing, “Failure is clearly only 
one of the many factors that contribute to the dropout decision.”  
Warren, Jenkins, and Kulick (2006) undertook a long-term analysis of 
high school exit examinations in association with high school completion as well 
as GED rates between 1975 and 2002. In contrast with other studies, they account 
for more difficult high stakes exams as a separate group than simpler, minimum 
competency exams. They found an association between the presence of high 
stakes exam schemes and lower high school completion rates, as well as higher 
rates of GED test taking. This association was also more evident when poverty 
rates or proportions of racial and ethnic minorities increased. Additionally, in 
states where exams were deemed “more difficult,” graduation rates were about 
5
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2.1 percentage points lower than schools with minimum competency high stakes 
exams. 
2.5 Conclusion  
The jury is still out as to whether high stakes testing provides adequate 
incentives for education systems to improve performance. From these studies, 
there really is no clear-cut answer as to whether high stakes tests close or widen 
the achievement gap. Thus, further research is necessary to investigate the true 
answer to this question. In the following section, the study addresses the 
methodological framework used to analyze the data, including a summary of the 
performance variables and covariates used in the models.  
 
3. Data Description 
The data set was compiled using information from the Massachusetts 
Department of Education (MADOE) and the US Department of Education 
(USDOE).5 MEAP and MCAS test score data was gathered from the MADOE, 
while school characteristics were taken from both sources. Additional dropout 
rates, senior plans, and SAT results from the MADOE were also merged into the 
dataset. All data used are at the district level.6 Statistics are reported annually 
between 1994 or 1995 and 2007 or 2008, depending on the performance statistic. 
In cases where only school data are reported and there is more than one high 
school in a district, weighted averages are calculated using enrollment as weights. 
Additionally, all vocational, charter, and agricultural schools are omitted from the 
data, since their funding structure and focus differ from traditional public high 
schools.7 Any year listed refers to the academic year which started the autumn 
prior; for example, 2008 refers to the 2007-2008 school year. Finally, all figures 
and tables referenced in this section are located in Appendix 1. 
3.1 High Achieving versus Low Achieving Districts 
To determine which districts are high achieving and low achieving, I use 
10th grade scores from the 1996 MEAP exam and 2000 MCAS exam. These two 
years were chosen because of the shift from the MEAP to the MCAS in 1998, and 
the shift from a low-stakes MCAS in 2000 to a high-stakes one in 2001. I refer to 
these years as “critical years” in the methodology. 
The MEAP was administered to 4th, 8th, and 12th grade students in 1988, 
1990, and 1992, and to 4th, 8th, and 10th grade students in 1994 and 1996. The test 
was made up mostly of math and English multiple-choice questions. Students 
designated as special needs or with limited English proficiency were not required 
to take the exam. Results were reported on a scale between 1000 and 1600, with 
the state average set at 1300. Individual results were reported in one of five levels. 
                                                 
5
 The dataset was initially used for Downes and Zabel (2007). 
6
 Limitations in dropout rate data prevented any analysis on the school or individual level. 
7
 Charter schools in particular were legalized in 1993, though most were not founded until 1998 or 
later. 
6
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 6 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol6/iss1/8
   
To compare districts, I summed the mean math and English MEAP scores for 
each district.8 MCAS results, on the other hand, are reported in one of four 
performance levels.9 For the year 2000, I summed the total percentage of students 
from each district in the advanced and proficient category (required for 
graduation) for math and English, and grouped them on that metric. 
Four different groupings were used in this study: two in 1996 and two in 
2000. Within each year, high achieving districts were defined as those in either 
the top quartile or top decile of school districts within Massachusetts in that year’s 
exam, while those in the lowest quartile or decile were defined as low achieving 
districts. These groupings were fairly robust regardless of the grouping definition. 
3.2 Performance Variables 
Three variables were used in this paper to measure district performance: 
high school dropout rates, senior plans, and district average SAT math and verbal 
scores. Means for these variables are summarized by year in Table 1.2. 
One important goal for educators is to keep kids in school. The 
Massachusetts Education commission notes that students who never graduate with 
a high school diploma are much less likely to get a job and are more likely to be 
involved in crime (Lee, Shaefer, and Messner-Zidell 2007). As such, the dropout 
rate for students in grades 9-12 is a particularly good metric to gauge a district’s 
ability to fulfill this objective. The adjusted rate was first used in 1993, the earliest 
point at which this report uses the data (see Appendix 2 for MADOE’s calculation 
for dropout rate). Figure 1.1 depicts these annual Massachusetts rates by group. A 
time trend regression shows that the groups are, in fact, diverging over time (see 
Table 1.3), an indication that high achieving groups are performing better relative 
to low achieving groups. However, a separate regression indicated that there was 
no significant break or change from this trend in 1998 (see Table 1.4) or 2001.  
Additionally, some of the fluctuations in data can be attributed to the changes in 
the dropout calculation, also noted in Appendix 2.  
 The second performance variable is the results from an annual poll given 
to all seniors graduating from Massachusetts high schools. The methods of this 
survey are described by the MADOE as follows: “Data about the plans of high 
school graduates were obtained from the Year-End School Indicator Report, a 
survey of Massachusetts public schools conducted by the Department of 
Elementary and Secondary Education at the end of every school year. School 
officials report the number of graduating students by gender and race across nine 
categories of post-graduation plans.” On this survey, students could be placed in 
                                                 
8
 All 1992 MEAP scores were fairly correlated to those from 1996 (r=.7588). Low achieving 
district scores had about the same correlation (r=.7451), though high achieving district scores were 
less correlated (r=.5732). 
9
 A large number of special needs students are required to take the MCAS, not true for the MEAP, 
though exemptions are still made. Students with limited English proficiency, however, must take 
the test. 
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one of the following options: 4-year public college, 4-year private college, 2-year 
public college, 2-year private college, other post secondary, work, military, other, 
or unknown. Results were given in percentage terms. I summed together all 
responses for 4-year universities to create the statistic “four.” The use of 4-year 
universities is motivated by the focus of this analysis on high achieving 
students.10 These results are available back to the graduating class of 1995.11 
Statewide means of senior plans are shown in Figure 1.2. Overall, the percentage 
of students attending a 4-year college is steadily increasing, though upon 
inspection between achievement groups, the gap seems to be diverging. A time 
trend regression confirmed these results (see Table 1.3), although again there was 
no significant break in 1998 or 2001. 
 The final performance variable is the average score in each district from 
the math sections and the verbal sections of the SAT. Scores in each section are 
on a scale of 200 (the lowest) to 800 (the highest), are given in 10-point 
increments, and are distributed on a normal curve.12 The exam is administered on 
a national basis, and though it is technically not mandatory or high stakes, many 
colleges and universities require SAT results for admission. Thus, much like 
senior plans, SAT results are also a good indicator of high achieving students, 
particularly those who will attend college. Scores from the two sections were 
summed together to create one total SAT score variable. Because CollegeBoard, 
the testing agency, has private ownership of data rights, SAT scores are sparsely 
available and were only found for the following seven years: 1995, 1997, 2000, 
2001, 2005, 2006, and 2007. The mean scores for each district, by year, are 
depicted by group in Figure 1.3. Results from a time trend indicated no significant 
change in the score gap (see Table 1.3) and further analysis showed no distinct 
break in 1998 or 2001. 
Conventionally, one might think that schools aim to have low dropout 
rates, high college plans, and high SAT scores. In theory, dropout rates should 
increase with a new standard (such as a high stakes test) that may inhibit 
graduation. But, as noted by Papay, Murnane, and Willett (2009), there is the 
equal possibility that students who pass could discover a newfound motivation to 
graduate. Thus, the effect on dropout rate could go either way. Furthermore, a 
high dropout rate could unintentionally have a positive effect on senior plan and 
SAT results. Since the poll is done in percentage terms in the final year of school, 
all students must have already passed the MCAS, biasing results upward for the 
entire district. Additionally, students who do not pass the MCAS are unlikely to 
                                                 
10
 Undoubtedly, I recognize that those who attended two-year schools or those who entered the 
military or the workforce are not “failures” by any means—and many may have continued onto a 
4-year college afterwards. 
11
 On occasion, a district listed more than 50% of students “unknown,” a situation in which the 
district’s results for that year were omitted.  
12
 The exam format changed in 2006—see Appendix 2 for further details. 
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ever take the SAT, raising that mean district score. Following this logic, there is a 
selection bias: all else equal, districts with high dropout rates could be more likely 
to boast better senior plans and SAT results than those with lower dropout rates 
because underperforming students would have dropped out. But with the dropout 
rate effect ambiguous, senior plan results and SAT scores could go either way as 
well. These countervailing effects makes it virtually impossible to distinguish 
whether a high percentage of seniors attending a four year college and a high SAT 
score is actually an indicator of district success or failure. 
Based on these statewide trends, there has been little change in the status 
of Massachusetts students over the last 10-15 years. In general, rates remain 
relatively constant and, arguably, perhaps improving slightly. And though there is 
some evidence of the gap between high and low achieving districts widening with 
regards to dropout rates and senior plans, no break or shift seems to occur in 
either 1998 or 2001 that could be attributable to MCAS. 
Covariates 
 The covariates considered for this report are the percentage of low income 
students, the percentage of special education students, the total enrollment of 
secondary students in each district (which was divided by 1000), and the 
expenditures per pupil in each district (also divided by 1000). This last variable is 
based on the overall day program cost per student, across all grades (data for only 
secondary school students was not available).13 To account for inflation in 
regressions with binary variables, the natural log of per pupil expenditure was 
utilized. Summary statistics are noted in Table 1.5. 
 
4. Methodology 
This section develops the analytical procedures used and predictions based 
on the introduction and literature review. The question posited is whether high 
achieving school districts were negatively impacted by the implementation of the 
MCAS exam relative to low achieving school districts. First, I categorize each 
district as either high achieving, low achieving, or in the middle as described in 
the previous section. Then, three general types of regressions were used. Each 
regression was run twelve times: once for each performance statistic (dropout 
rate, senior plans, and SAT scores), once for each critical year (1996 or 2000), 
and once for each grouping (quartile or decile). In all cases, districts not in the 
high or low achieving groupings (the middle 50% or 80% of districts) were 
excluded from the regressions.  
4.1 Long term model 
I first look at a long term model and consider the performance trends 
between 1994 (or 1995) and 2008. Here, I estimate the difference in the average 
change in achievement between the low achieving and high achieving districts. 
                                                 
13
 Reporting procedures for district expenditure and per pupil expenditures changed in 2005. 
However, these effects should be minimal across all districts given the relative nature of the study. 
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Included in these models are district characteristics that might otherwise influence 
levels of achievement. These characteristics consist of the percentage of low-
income students in each district, the percentage of special education students in 
each district, the overall secondary school enrollment in each district, and per 
pupil expenditure in each district.  
Adt = β0 + β1Yt + β2Xdt + β3LOWER + β4LOWER • Yt +ε dt     (1) 
where 
t = 1994-2008 for dropout rate, 1995-2008 for senior plans, and {1995, 
1997, 2000, 2001, 2005-2007} for SAT scores 
Adt  = achievement in district d in year t 
Yt  = 1 if year = t and 0 otherwise 
Xdt  = additional covariates 
LOWER = -1 if in lowest achievement grouping, 0 otherwise 
These regressions are weighted by enrollment. Of greatest importance in the 
above model is the coefficient β4  for the interaction term LOWER • Yt . If the 
effects of the MCAS have aided low achieving districts relative to high achieving 
ones, β4  should be negative for dropout rates and positive for senior plans and 
SAT results. 
 Additionally, I use a second regression to measure the average impact 
after the implementation of the exam instead of using individual yearly interaction 
terms. The regression is as follows: 
 Adt = β0 + β1Yt + β2Xdt + β3LOWER + β4LOWER • DUMPOST +ε dt   (2) 
 where 
 DUMPOST = 1 if year equal to or after critical year, 0 otherwise 
β4  is the significant term in this equation and should be negative for dropout rates 
and positive for senior plans and SAT results if the gap is closing.  
4.2 Fixed Effects 
The fixed effects model is very similar to the long term model, but 
includes an additional term to account for any unaccounted time invariant district-
level covariates that are correlated with LOWER in the previous model. This is 
represented by ud  in the model: 
Adt = β0 + β1Yt + β2Xdt + β3LOWER • Yt + ud +ε dt     (3) 
where 
ud  = district fixed effects 
Note that the dummy variable LOWER is omitted from the model, unlike in the 
long term model, because the fixed effects capture all time invariant factors that 
affect the dependent variable. As in the long term model, the important term is the 
coefficient β3  for the interaction term LOWER • Yt . Once again, if the effects of 
the MCAS have helped the low achievers relative to the high achievers, β3  should 
be should be negative for dropout rates and positive for senior plans and SATs.  
10
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Much like in the long term model, a second fixed effects model helps 
calculate the mean effect after the critical year. To do so, the regression uses an 
interaction term made up of two dummy variables: 
Adt = β0 + β1Yt + β2Xdt + β3LOWER • DUMPOST + ud +ε dt    (4) 
If the gap between high achieving and low achieving districts is closing,β3  should 
be should be negative for dropout rates and positive for senior plans and SATs.  
4.3 Individual District Linear Trends 
This last model accounts for the possibility that the differences in 
performance between high and low performing districts would have changed in 
the absence of MCAS reform. Thus, the linear trends model accounts for this 
possibility by including individual district trend lines in the regression, notated 
here by ud • t . 
Adt = β0 + β1Yt + β2Xdt + β3LOWER • Yt + ud + ud • t +ε dt    (5) 
where 
ud • t  = individual district trends (unobserved characteristics for each 
district multiplied by the time vector t) 
By controlling for the trend of each district without MCAS, this model measures 
the actual impact of the MCAS in each year. Once again, the β3 coefficient is 
important as a negative value for dropout rate or positive value for senior plans 
and SAT results indicates that the gap between high and low achievers is closing.  
As with fixed effects, this model is repeated with an averaged interaction 
term evaluating correlation between performance and achievement group only 
after the critical year. The model is: 
Adt = β0 + β1Yt + β2Xdt + β3LOWER • DUMPOST + ud + ud • t +ε dt     (6) 
β3 should be negative for dropout rate and positive senior plans and SATs if the 
gap between high and low achievers is closing.  
 
5. Results 
 Over the fifteen year period, I consider 226 districts in my analysis.14 This 
section is divided into two sections: a more qualitative analysis of Massachusetts 
performance compared to other states, as well as relative analyses within the state, 
which are described using models in the previous section. Figures and tabular 
results can be found in Appendix 3. 
5.1 State-by-state analysis 
National-level data are as to whether Massachusetts has been improving 
over the last 15 years. On the national scale, Massachusetts surpasses most states 
in student academic performance. Massachusetts consistently scores among the 
best in the country on the NAEP exam (see Figures 3.1a and 3.1b for 8th grade 
exam results), with the state’s relative performance remaining relatively constant 
                                                 
14
 A few districts are occasionally omitted each year because of reporting errors from the 
MADOE. 
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over the last 10-15 years—unchanged around the implementation of the MCAS. 
These results are consistent with international test findings that have shown that 
Massachusetts students outrank every nation except for Singapore (Meier 2002). 
When considering dropout rates, dropout rates have been steadily anchored 
around 3.5%, roughly in the middle of other states in New England. This may be 
partially due to the fact that other states in New England do not have cities as 
large as those in Massachusetts nor do they have comparable urban communities 
(see Figure 3.2). The national dropout rate, however, has recently been improving 
while the Massachusetts rate has remained stagnant (see Figure 3.3). In terms of 
the percentage of seniors going to college, the trajectories of both Massachusetts 
and the country are increasing at roughly the same rate, indicating little change 
around MCAS implementation (see Figure 3.4). Lastly, SAT scores in 
Massachusetts have been improving drastically compared to the rest of the nation 
since 1998 (see Figure 3.5). Given the variegated nature of these trends, there is 
no definitive answer that Massachusetts students have improved or worsened 
compared to the rest of the nation since the implementation of the MCAS. 
5.2 Within-state analysis: 5.2a Long term model (1 & 2) 
In examining the effect of the MCAS over time, the long term regressions 
consider the years prior to the MCAS (1994 or 1995) up until the most recent data 
(2007 or 2008). The results are given in Tables 3.1a-d. None of these regressions 
yield results that indicate significant changes in gaps. Only the senior plans 
regression with year 2000 groupings at the 25th and 75th percentile have significant 
interaction terms in 1995, 1996, 1999, 2003, and 2004—but jointly they are 
insignificant (F=1.29, p=.2122). The changes noticed within these models are a 
result almost entirely of the covariates. All covariates are significant at the α  = .01 
level, except for percent special education in all models and per pupil expenditure 
in dropout regressions using decile groupings (also insignificant). The mean 
model long-term regression results are found in the first three columns of Table 
3.4. Much like the previous models, the results indicate no significant effects. 
Again, most of the changes in the model are attributable to the covariates, which 
are significant in almost every case. 
5.2b Fixed Effects (3 & 4) 
 I re-run the two long term regressions from the previous section but now 
account for potentially unobserved effects; the results are in Table 3.2, and are 
drastically different. No longer do the covariates explain dropout rates and senior 
plans, but all of the senior plans models have significant yearly interaction terms. 
In the 1996 25th/75th model, only 1998, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2007 are 
insignificant, and jointly they are significant as well (p=.0033). The 2000 25th/75th 
model have similar results (2002, 2004, 2005, and 2007 are insignificant, jointly 
p=.0019), as with the 2000 10th/90th model (2001-2007 are insignificant, p=.0083). 
Only in the 1996 10th/90th model are the terms not jointly significant (1997, 1998, 
2002, and 2005-7 are insignificant, jointly p=.1219), All of these significant 
coefficients are negative, indicating that the gap between low and high achieving 
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districts has increased. In other words, high achieving districts are more likely to 
have students planning to go to a four year college in 2008 than earlier—roughly 
4%, depending on the year and model. However, when taking an average of the 
interaction terms of the years after the MCAS, only the models with groupings in 
2000 are significant (results in Table 3.4). 
The fixed effects models using dropout rate as the dependent variable 
demonstrate similar results. The interaction terms in 1996 and 1997 are significant 
in the decile models, but were not enough to make a significant impact in the 
yearly interaction regressions. In the mean dropout rate models, however, the 
mean term coefficient is always significant (p=.0402; p=.0012; p=.0076; and 
p=.0279 respectively), also indicating an increasing gap. This indicates, once 
again, that the gap between high and low achieving districts is growing, implied 
by the fact that dropout rates have been decreasing at a faster rate for high 
achieving districts than low achieving districts since 1998.  Though these results 
are not reflected in every yearly interaction term model, the mean model findings 
provide some support for the possibility that the gap is widening. 
In contrast with senior plans and dropout rate, the SAT model has few 
significant results. Though there were significant results in 2001 for the 1996 
10th/90th groupings and 2000 25th/75th groupings, none are significant in mean 
models. 
Thus, these results seem to indicate that there is some evidence for an 
effect of the MCAS and, if anything, imply high achieving districts have done 
relatively better than low achieving districts. 
5.2c Individual District Trends (5 & 6) 
 This final section runs the same regressions that were run in the previous 
fixed effects section, but also includes the trend lines for every district in the 
model, thus accounting for any potential trend prior to the MCAS in 1998. Results 
can be found in Table 3.3. The variable for 1994 is omitted in the dropout rate 
models and 1995 is omitted in the senior plans models and SAT models due to 
collinearity. Additionally, a number of individual district trends are omitted due to 
collinearity. However, no observations are lost in any regression. 
 No district trends regressions support the findings noted in the previous 
fixed effects models. Only the SAT models grouped in 2001 are jointly significant 
(p=.0007 and p=.0152) and those regressions only have a significant yearly 
interaction term in 2001. When running mean model regressions that average the 
overall effect after the MCAS, none are found to be significant (see Table 3.4). 
This implies that, though there seems to be some evidence indicating an 
increasing gap in the fixed effects models, that change in performance should be 
attributed pre-existing trends of each district. 
5.3 Additional Tests 
 To test all possible explanations, these regressions were re-run with the 
following variations: critical years other than 1998 and 2001, excluding years 
after 2002 in mean models, and senior plans including seniors intending to attend 
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either a 2- or 4-year college (rather than only a 4-year college).15 As before, the 
results are mostly inconclusive. If anything, the results indicate a widening of the 
gap between high and low achieving districts in the fixed effects and district 
trends models, though these findings are sporadic and inconsistent. 
 
6. Discussion 
 None of the long term models indicate any statistically significant effects 
of high-stakes testing on gaps. When fixed effects are included, some significant 
results become apparent: all of the mean models for dropout rate indicate a 
significant increase in the gap between high and low achieving districts, and a 
number of senior plans models find the gap increasing in terms of seniors going 
onto a four-year college. However, these effects disappear when prior trends are 
included, perhaps due to the large number of parameters included in the models. 
There are never any apparent effects on district SAT scores either. But when 
considering additional variations of these regressions, a few dropout and senior 
plans regressions show evidence of a widening gap. 
 Based on evidence from the national scale, it seems unlikely that the 
MCAS has had an absolute impact on either group. On NAEP exams, 
Massachusetts remains high above the national average. The percentage of seniors 
going to college remains constant. And though dropout rates have worsened 
relative to the national average, SAT scores are improving relative to the 
average—indicating an ambiguous effect overall (note that these last three metrics 
do not account for high and low achieving groups, a factor necessary to determine 
the actual gap). Additionally, around the years when the MCAS was 
implemented, there was no evidence of any break in trends. All in all, there is no 
clear evidence that the MCAS has either hurt or helped Massachusetts students in 
terms of dropout rate, percent of high school seniors attending a four year college, 
or SAT scores. 
Thus, at the very best, the MCAS has had a negligible impact on both high 
and low achieving school districts in Massachusetts; at the worst, the MCAS has 
actually widened this gap. Admittedly, there is no counterfactual to know what 
the state would have looked like had there been no MCAS. Yet this study’s results 
bring into question the true utility of the high stakes testing. Conventional wisdom 
has it that standardized testing would aid low achieving schools at the cost of high 
achieving ones, but these results indicate otherwise. In fact, they indicate a 
marginal effect at best. Though the MCAS’s initial purpose under the 
Massachusetts Education Reform Act was to evaluate progress towards meeting 
                                                 
15
 Other critical years are considered because class graduation years do not necessarily line up 
with implementation dates (i.e. a student who takes the exam in 2001 is not scheduled to graduate 
until 2003). I exclude years after 2002 to account for potential effects of NCLB. Lastly, I include 
2-year colleges in senior plans to offset confounds from 4-year college costs. None of these 
additional test results are available in the appendix. 
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certain curricula goals, No Child Left Behind fully expected these high stakes 
exams to close the this gap. In the latter sense, it appears that the MCAS has 
failed. 
It is important to note that these results refer only to three performance 
variables, yet combined they provide a fairly holistic view of school populations. 
Dropout rates are frequently used to gauge the performance of low achieving 
students in each district. Senior plans and SAT results, on the other hand, evaluate 
the performance of high achievers much better than dropout rate. However, these 
metrics do have their limitations: senior plans are just that—plans—and may not 
necessarily translate into actual action. Furthermore, SAT exams are designed to 
evaluate an individual’s basic knowledge of subjects, which may not be variable 
and thus not accurately reflect district performance. The same applies to the other 
metrics; it is possible that by 10th grade, student performance is already set and 
unrelated to the quality of education provided by high school districts. Even so, 
similar concerns arise with most any such performance statistic.  
The findings of this study fall into line with a growing body of research 
(such as Jacob (2001)) that suggests accountability has little impact on student 
performance. Further research in other geographic areas is necessary to determine 
whether the case in Massachusetts is an isolated one. Additionally, future studies 
should test students who have experienced the total, overall impact of NCLB 
throughout their educational experience, since the act was intended to affect all 
grades rather than just high school exit exams. Still, it seems as though the 
benefits of high stakes accountability may be fewer than previously considered. 
Though the exams do provide a tool to adjust state finances as appropriate, this 
study provides some evidence that they may be hurting low achieving districts. At 
the very least, based on these results, education reformers may want to give pause 
before continuing with plans to further implement high stakes testing. 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Data Description Figures and Tables 
Table 1.1: Variable Names and Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
dropout_rate Four year district dropout rate 
four Senior plans 
sat Mean district SAT score (combined math and verbal) 
critical year 1998 or 2001, depending on the regression 
dumpost = 1 if the year is after the critical year, 0 otherwise 
lower = 1 if district is defined as “low achieving”, 0 otherwise 
percent_low_income Percentage of students considered “low income,” as 
defined by the MADOE 
percent_special_ed Percentage of students in district considered as special 
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education 
enrollment district student population, considering students in grades 
9-12 
ppexpend Natural log of dollars spent per student within each district 
 
Table 1.2: Mean performance variables by 1996 groupings (weighted by 
enrollment) 
Dropout Rate 
Year 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 90th Percentile 
1994 7.609421 5.926844 3.864032 1.208415 .8468851 
1995 7.429772 5.6422 3.624792 1.316532 .8753113 
1996 6.247061 5.153229 3.425415 1.092398 .7758167 
1997 6.539105 5.266373 3.537774 1.231741 .7566619 
1998 7.02547 5.517542 3.552372 1.256589 .715624 
1999 7.440297 5.8679 3.652625 1.111761 .6935771 
2000 7.109153 5.648982 3.4924 1.106651 .6238931 
2001 7.037298 5.6417 3.529432 1.035199 .6248069 
2002 6.069376 4.927438 3.139517 0.9337584 .5389764 
2003 6.668582 5.423087 3.431702 1.010492 .615037 
2004 7.302666 6.03224 3.77084 1.058741 .6993818 
2005 7.677438 6.175788 3.767443 0.9820527 .6783238 
2006 7.410342 5.818034 3.462651 0.8578059 .5469732 
2007 7.707436 6.166741 3.774623 1.1066 .6534988 
2008 7.083289 5.611858 3.380825 0.8610518 .6029412 
Senior Plans 
Year 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 90th Percentile 
1995 39.79091 44.44349 55.75297 75.62802 81.98032 
1996 40.58042 45.75355 57.00801 76.22893 82.911 
1997 39.318 44.53621 56.45624 76.76264 83.22346 
1998 37.31496 42.84183 56.04421 76.96205 83.64376 
1999 38.14162 43.41039 55.58307 76.33807 84.09256 
2000 38.13686 43.57513 56.15636 76.00074 83.02211 
2001 36.52235 42.60561 56.42805 77.15539 83.12391 
2002 35.85154 42.07804 56.21693 77.24147 83.50712 
2003 37.89574 44.44009 57.9318 77.96178 83.88916 
2004 41.47276 45.86176 58.43731 78.63304 84.26327 
2005 39.26914 44.92835 59.37812 79.73645 86.06256 
2006 39.76345 45.23758 59.14301 79.91664 86.49944 
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2007 40.48618 45.64841 59.59997 80.88523 87.12196 
2008 40.22649 44.77421 59.33587 81.78014 88.02857 
SAT 
Year 
10th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 90th Percentile 
1995 874.518 915.8651 982.2497 1082.841 1131.968 
1997 886.3007 923.5853 989.1631 1090.378 1140.634 
2000 892.0295 930.7892 997.6647 1103.783 1156.943 
2001 892.8858 931.334 999.2171 1101.79 1154.009 
2005 916.8051 950.6796 1022.066 1129.913 1186.604 
2006 904.4927 938.8459 1009.961 1120.543 1181.004 
2007 902.4286 936.7442 1008.17 1116.539 1177.31 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  Dropout rate over time, weighted by enrollment (using 1996 25th/75th 
percentile groupings) 
Dropout Rate Over Time
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Figure 1.2:  Percentage of high school seniors attending college in MA, weighted 
by enrollment 
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Senior Plans Over Time
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Figure 1.3:  Massachusetts SAT Results (weighted by enrollment) 
Mean SAT Score Over Time
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*Note: the above graphs use national data from the NCES, CollegeBoard and the 
BLS rather than the MADOE, and thus includes vocational and charter schools. 
Additionally, NAEP data from MA in 2002 was omitted in the national report. 
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Table 1.3: Time trend regression results (1996 25/75 groupings) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES dropout_rate sr_plans sat 
    
year -0.018 0.420** 2.638** 
 (0.012) (0.080) (0.532) 
lower -92.193* 627.000* 1,032.476 
 (37.672) (243.647) (1,610.896) 
yearlower 0.048* -0.325** -0.577 
 (0.019) (0.122) (0.805) 
    
Observations 3353 3133 1570 
Adj R-squared 0.391 0.427 0.461 
SER 2.321 13.52 66.62 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 1.4: Regression with binary variable indicating post-critical year (1996 
25/75 groupings) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES dropout_rate sr_plans sat 
    
year -0.004 0.490** 2.606 
 (0.028) (0.167) (1.463) 
dumpost 0.040 -2.644 4.310 
 (0.278) (1.706) (14.181) 
    
Observations 1838 1716 859 
Adj R-squared -0.001 0.004 0.012 
SER 3.305 19.75 104.6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 1.5: Means and standard deviations for covariates (weighted by enrollment) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Percent Low Income 26.03209 24.16897 
Percent Special Education 16.39057 2.961837 
Enrollment 2.886367 4.506382 
Per Pupil Expenditures 2.045017 .3133035 
 
Appendix 2: Changes in Performance Statistic Calculations 
19
Havdala: High Stakes Testing in High and Low Achieving School Districts
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2010
   
Since 1993, high school dropout rate has been calculated by the MADOE 
in the following manner: 
Annual Dropout Rate in year t = (Dropouts - Returned Dropouts) = Final Dropout Count
Enrollment Grades 9 -12 on October 1 in year t -1
 x 100  
Note that the dropout rate adjusts for those who return to school. 
There have been minor adjustments to the dropout rate calculation that 
have biased dropout rates in 2002, 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
• In 2002, summer dropouts were omitted from the model, lowering the 
overall dropout rate (this was fixed in 2003). 
• In 2005-6, the MADOE started working with the GED testing service, an 
exam which provides an equivalency for a high school diploma. Now, 
individuals who receive GED’s are no longer considered dropouts 
(lowering dropout rates). 
• In 2006-7, the MADOE began to consider students who claim to be 
transferring districts but never reenroll as dropouts (raising rates). 
Though these changes do bias results, all regressions were relative and thus 
affected both high and low achieving districts equally. This is one reason why 
year dummies were included in the model to pick up year-to-year variations in the 
dropout rates. 
Furthermore, dropout rate regressions were run omitting these years. 
Results were almost identical to those cited in the report. The only notable 
differences were in the fixed effects models: both 1996 models had significant 
yearly interaction terms, and the 2000 10/90 mean model had a significant 
positive coefficient. Again, however, these effects disappeared when districts 
trends were included, and thus the conclusions in the paper remain the same. 
Additionally, the SAT changed format, which reflected in the results 
reported for 2006. Specifically, the verbal section no longer contained analogies 
and antonyms but more sentence completions and reading comprehension 
questions. However, as scores are still scaled according to a normal distribution, 
there should have been no confounding effect of the new exam. 
 
Appendix 3: Absolute Analysis and Regression Results 
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Figures 3.1a & 3.1b: 8th Grade Math and Reading NAEP Exam over time 
8th Grade NAEP by Year, Math Exam
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*Note that the X axis is not to scale in the above two figures 
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Figure 3.2:  Dropout rates around New England 
New England High School Dropout Rates
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Figure 3.3:  National dropout rate comparison 
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Figure 3.4:  Percentage of high school seniors attending college over time 
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Percent of High School Graduates Attending College (2 Year or 4 Year)
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Figure 3.5:  Mean SAT Scores Over Time 
Combined Mean SAT Score (Math and Verbal)
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Note: Tables 3.1-3.4 refer to groupings from the 1996 MEAP at the 25th and 75th 
percentiles. 
 
Table 3.1: Long term model (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES dropout_rate sr_plans sat 
    
y1994lower 0.798   
 (0.452)   
y1995lower 0.319 3.215 1.362 
 (0.449) (2.204) (11.274) 
y1996lower 0.068 3.191  
 (0.445) (2.185)  
y1997lower -0.030 1.823 1.580 
 (0.443) (2.175) (11.104) 
y1998lower 0.218 0.057  
 (0.440) (2.155)  
y1999lower 0.581 1.978  
 (0.436) (2.140)  
y2000lower 0.373 2.219 -3.866 
 (0.432) (2.120) (10.813) 
y2001lower 0.395 0.176 0.067 
 (0.428) (2.102) (10.717) 
y2002lower -0.302 -0.297  
 (0.428) (2.101)  
y2003lower -0.099 2.984  
 (0.425) (2.088)  
y2004lower 0.413 3.528  
 (0.419) (2.058)  
y2005lower 0.568 1.619 1.772 
 (0.417) (2.048) (10.436) 
y2006lower 0.359 1.288 -3.035 
 (0.416) (2.041) (10.429) 
y2007lower 0.396 1.166  
 (0.415) (2.039)  
percent_low_income 0.094** -0.488** -2.535** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.094) 
percent_special_ed -0.005 -0.534** 0.699 
 (0.015) (0.076) (0.538) 
enrollment 0.069** 0.274** -1.891** 
 (0.011) (0.055) (0.390) 
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ppexpend -2.497** 23.451** 112.466** 
 (0.270) (1.379) (9.791) 
    
Observations 1837 1715 859 
Adj R-squared 0.755 0.837 0.850 
SER 1.636 8.000 40.75 
    
Yearly variable term F test p-value .0106* <.0001*
* 
.0001** 
Interaction term F test p-value .5990 .7408 .9977 
Covariates F test p-value <.0001** <.0001*
* 
<.0001** 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 3.2: Fixed Effects (3) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES dropout_rate sr_plans sat 
    
y1994lower_m 0.001   
 (0.336)   
y1995lower_m 0.290 -5.016** -8.267 
 (0.331) (1.525) (6.044) 
y1996lower_m 0.392 -5.111**  
 (0.329) (1.512)  
y1997lower_m 0.532 -3.132* -3.837 
 (0.328) (1.510) (5.920) 
y1998lower_m 0.255 -2.914  
 (0.328) (1.505)  
y1999lower_m 0.125 -4.822**  
 (0.326) (1.496)  
y2000lower_m 0.237 -6.261** -2.137 
 (0.325) (1.493) (5.772) 
y2001lower_m 0.134 -2.974* -5.277 
 (0.324) (1.487) (5.738) 
y2002lower_m 0.344 -2.169  
 (0.325) (1.490)  
y2003lower_m -0.151 -4.735**  
 (0.324) (1.486)  
y2004lower_m -0.533 -2.442  
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 (0.319) (1.462)  
y2005lower_m -0.506 -2.255 2.800 
 (0.318) (1.455) (5.545) 
y2006lower_m 0.107 -3.128* 1.097 
 (0.317) (1.453) (5.530) 
y2007lower_m -0.008 -1.145  
 (0.317) (1.449)  
percent_low_income 0.032** -0.162** -0.788** 
 (0.011) (0.052) (0.280) 
percent_special_ed -0.026 -0.150* 0.089 
 (0.016) (0.076) (0.397) 
enrollment -0.330 -0.466 7.372 
 (0.189) (0.941) (4.742) 
ppexpend -0.176   
 (0.491)   
    
Observations 1837 1715 859 
Adj R-squared -0.039 -0.009 0.178 
SER 1.241 5.677 21.58 
    
Yearly variable term F test p-value .9792 .0215 <.0001*
* 
Interaction term F test p-value .0512 .0027** .5818 
Covariates F test p-value .0152* .0033** .0649 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 3.3: District Trends (5) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES dropout_rate sr_plans sat 
    
percent_low_income 0.040** -0.139 -0.093 
 (0.014) (0.074) (0.398) 
percent_special_ed -0.042* 0.048 0.653 
 (0.018) (0.091) (0.461) 
enrollment 0.310 1.232 5.644 
 (0.385) (2.046) (12.243) 
ppexpend -0.152 5.257 7.645 
 (0.641) (3.282) (18.184) 
y1995lower_m 0.283   
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 (0.281)   
y1996lower_m 0.392 -0.368  
 (0.273) (1.341)  
y1997lower_m 0.553* 1.233 2.228 
 (0.267) (1.303) (4.626) 
y1998lower_m 0.260 1.244  
 (0.263) (1.272)  
y1999lower_m 0.143 -1.006  
 (0.258) (1.248)  
y2000lower_m 0.252 -2.673* 1.957 
 (0.258) (1.244) (4.468) 
y2001lower_m 0.150 0.083 -2.321 
 (0.256) (1.229) (4.409) 
y2002lower_m 0.362 0.332  
 (0.259) (1.236)  
y2003lower_m -0.117 -2.822*  
 (0.259) (1.239)  
y2004lower_m -0.499 -0.783  
 (0.261) (1.242)  
y2005lower_m -0.489 -0.914 3.831 
 (0.266) (1.265) (4.591) 
y2006lower_m 0.119 -2.137 1.014 
 (0.274) (1.302) (4.757) 
y2007lower_m 0.002 -0.547  
 (0.282) (1.342)  
    
Observations 1837 1715 859 
Adj R-squared 0.123 0.073 0.343 
SER 1.140 5.443 19.28 
    
Yearly variable term F test p-value .9061 .2745 <.0001*
* 
Interaction term F test p-value .0858 .0948 .8615 
Covariates F test p-value .0062** .1320 .6225 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 3.4: Mean Model (2, 4, 6) 
NOTE: The first three regressions are long term models; the fourth through sixth regressions are fixed effects models; 
and the final three are district trends models. Additionally, post_p75m represents LOWER • DUMPOST , noted in the 
methodology. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES dropout_rate sr_plans sat dropout_rate sr_plans sat dropout_rate sr_plans sat 
          
percent_low_income 0.094** -0.487** -2.534** 0.038** -0.231** -0.896** 0.041** -0.146* -0.091 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.093) (0.010) (0.049) (0.262) (0.014) (0.074) (0.394) 
percent_special_ed -0.004 -0.532** 0.694 -0.027 -0.131 0.124 -0.043* 0.052 0.654 
 (0.015) (0.076) (0.536) (0.016) (0.076) (0.396) (0.018) (0.091) (0.459) 
enrollment 0.070** 0.276** -1.893** -0.355 -0.054 7.833 0.315 1.510 4.942 
 (0.011) (0.054) (0.388) (0.188) (0.939) (4.698) (0.383) (2.033) (12.093) 
ppexpend -2.517** 23.336** 112.483** -0.260 -1.072 -1.089 -0.467 5.079 7.230 
 (0.269) (1.371) (9.732) (0.483) (2.417) (13.012) (0.632) (3.241) (18.007) 
post_p75m -0.016 -1.380 -2.440 0.290* -1.133 -4.725 0.076 0.812 1.838 
 (0.192) (1.050) (6.838) (0.141) (0.710) (3.593) (0.193) (0.938) (5.339) 
          
Observations 1837 1715 859 1837 1715 859 1837 1715 859 
Adj R-squared 0.755 0.837 0.851 -0.043 -0.020 0.180 0.118 0.068 0.346 
SER 1.636 7.990 40.64 1.243 5.708 21.55 1.143 5.456 19.25 
          
Yearly variable term F test p-value <.0001** <.0001** <.0001** .0004** .0027** <.0001** .0008** .4439 <.0001** 
Covariates F test p-value <.0001** <.0001** <.0001** .0011** <.0001** .0107* .0032** .1084 .6293 
          
Standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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